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Abstract
We consider a spatial model of the emergence of cooperation with synchronous
births and deaths. Agents bear a tag and interact with their neighbors by playing
the prisoner’s dilemma game with strategies depending on their own and opponent’s
tags. An agent’s payoff determines its chances of reproducing and passing on its
strategy. We show that when tags are assigned at random rather than inherited, a
significant heterophilic population of about 40 % of the whole can emerge and persist.
Heterophilics defect on agents bearing the same tag as theirs and cooperate with
others. In our setting, the emergence of heterophily is explained by the correlation
between an agent’s payoff and its neighbors’ payoffs. The advantage of heterophily
over homophily (cooperating with agents bearing one’s tag and defecting with others)
when tags are assigned at random makes the emergence of the later an even more
interesting phenomenon than previously thought.
Keywords: heterophily, evolutionary dynamics, kin selection, tag-based cooperation, pris-
oner’s dilemma.
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1 Introduction
Why would individuals cooperate at a cost when they can benefit from others’ cooper-
ation whatever their own behavior? In such situations, individuals have an immediate in-
centive to free ride on others’ cooperation by defecting (not cooperating), although mutual
defection may yield lower payoffs than mutual cooperation. For this reason the emergence
and persistence of cooperation in populations has attracted interest from evolutionary
biologists and political scientists alike.
The proverbial prisoner’s dilemma game (or close variants) has largely been used to
model interactions between two individuals who may either cooperate at a cost, or defect
at zero cost. We retain the following formulation of the game: a player who cooperates
incurs a cost c > 0 while his opponent gets a benefit b > c. Thus, mutual cooperation
yields b − c > 0 for each player. Free riding is tempting since it yields b, but mutual
defection yields 0 for each player. The worse possible outcome is cooperating and being
exploited by a free rider: the payoff is then −c for the cooperator. The matrix of the game
is:
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate b− c, b− c −c, b
Defect b,−c 0,0
.
In evolutionary accounts of the emergence of cooperation, an individual’s strategy (de-
fect or cooperate) is inherited from his parents, and an individual’s reproductive fitness
depends on the payoff resulting from interactions with others. If individuals interact in-
discriminately, exploitation of cooperators by defectors will prevent cooperation to emerge
and persist in the population [1]. A wide range of mechanisms that can uphold cooperation
have been proposed, from population viscosity or spatial structure [21] to repeated inter-
actions [1]. We refer to [28] and the references therein for a review of these mechanisms.
One such mechanism is the existence of heritable, recognizable, phenotypic markers, or
tags, allowing for differentiated strategies. It was first hypothesized that a gene coding for
both a recognizable tag, or green beard, and for cooperation with tag-bearing individuals
could uphold the emergence of cooperation [4, 11, 12]. Instances of such genes in nature,
however, remain rare and debated [22]. The green-beard effect is to be distinguished
from the armpit effect, where different genes code for the tag (the armpit smell) and for
cooperation with tag-bearing individuals [5, 9]. While the armpit effect can uphold the
emergence of cooperation, a population of contingent cooperators would be vulnerable to
exploitation by tag-bearing defectors [3, 6].
Models were subsequently developed to investigate the conditions under which tags
can promote the emergence and persistence of cooperation in settings where the prisoner’s
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dilemma game is a model of individual interactions. In particular, a classic result is that
the existence of several tags and spatial structure can lead to the emergence of clusters
of like-tagged individuals who cooperate with individuals bearing the same tag and defect
against others [2, 13–15, 17, 20, 25, 26]. In the following, we refer to such individuals as
homophilic.
The emergence of heterophily, that is cooperation with individuals bearing a different
tag and defection against like-tagged individuals,1 received comparatively less attention
than the emergence of homophily. Indeed, heterophilic cooperation hardly seems sustain-
able since heterophilic cooperators defect against their own kin bearing the same tag [19].
Yet it was shown that heterophily can emerge and persist for large b/c values in a spatially
structured population with exactly two tags [10, 18]. In spatial models where individuals
are able to choose their location, homophily and heterophily were shown to predominate
alternatively as b/c increases [16]. Other authors investigated the role of population struc-
ture, modeled by assortment – an individual’s probability of interacting with his own kin
[8]. In their model, heterophilic cooperators are able to emerge and persist by exploiting
homophilic cooperators for intermediate assortment. As for the evolution of homophily and
heterophily in well-mixed populations, we refer to [24] for a study of the properties of these
strategies, and a proof that they cannot persist in the presence of indiscriminate defectors.
Finally, notice that some simpler evolutionary accounts of homophily and heterophily do
not make reference to the prisoner’s dilemma game, and disregard interactions between
homophilic and heterophilic agents [7, 23].
In this article, we bring another example showing that heterophily can indeed emerge
under some conditions. We will see that when tags are not inherited but assigned ran-
domly, heterophily can reach qualitatively important levels, although not over wide pa-
rameter ranges. We will explain the advantage of heterophily as compared to homophily
in terms of payoff correlation. To our knowledge, payoff correlations have been overlooked
in the literature, or at least never been discussed explicitly. We rely on a standard spatial
model with synchronous births and deaths, in which tag-bearing agents interact by play-
ing the prisoner’s dilemma game with their neighbors. In our base model, we consider the
four pure strategies proposed in [2]: unconditional defection, heterophily, homophily, and
unconditional cooperation.
Our model and the simulation dynamics are introduced in Section 2. We present our
results in Section 3. First, we illustrate the emergence of heterophily and perform robust-
ness checks (Section 3.1). Then, we explain the advantage of heterophily over homophily
1In the literature, heterophilic cooperators are also referred to as out-group altruists, extra-tag altruists,
or traitorous individuals [24].
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with a model featuring only these two strategies (Section 3.2). Section 4 concludes.
2 Materials and methods
We consider a periodic two-dimensional square lattice with size n × n.2 For any cell
at coordinates I = (i, j) ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} × {0, . . . , n − 1}, we call the r-neighborhood
(with r ∈ N+∗), denoted Nr(I), the Moore neighborhood of I = (i, j) with range r.3 We
illustrate neighborhoods in Figure 1.
Figure 1: 1-neighborhood of the black cell: the black cell and the light grey cells. 2-
neighborhood of the black cell: the black cell, the light grey cells, and the dark grey cells.
Each cell is occupied by an agent. For the sake of simplicity, we identify cells and agents
in our notations. An agent I is endowed with
• a tag tI which is an integer between 0 and T − 1, where T is the number of possible
tags, and
• a strategy (s0I , s1I) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}, where s0I is the strategy played against agents
bearing the same tag, and s1I the strategy played against agents bearing a different
tag.
The simulation dynamics is as follow.
2n will be fixed throughout and, for the sake of simplicity, we will not show it as a parameter everywhere
it should be mentioned.
3Formally, Nk((i, j)) is defined as the set of cells (i′, j′) ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} × {0, . . . , n− 1} that satisfy:
• d(i′, i) ≤ k, and
• d(j′, j) ≤ k,
where function
d(a, a′) = min {| (a mod n)− (a′ mod n) |, | (a mod n+ n)− (a′ mod n) |, | (a mod n− n)− (a′ mod n) |}
is the periodic distance with periodicity n.
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Initialization. All agents on the grid are given a tag randomly drawn with uniform
probability in {0, . . . , T − 1}. Unless otherwise specified, they are also given a random
strategy drawn with uniform probability in {0, 1} × {0, 1}.
Interactions. In each generation, all agents interact with all other agents in their r-
neighborhood excluding themselves. Let agent I with tag tI and strategy (s0I , s1I) interact
with agent J with tag tJ and strategy (s0J , s1J). From this interaction, agent I earns payoff{ −c.s0I + b.s0J if tI = tJ
−c.s1I + b.s1J otherwise.
The total payoff obtained by agent I through interactions with its neighbors is denoted by
piI .
Reproduction and inheritance. Once all agents have interacted with their neighbors,
a new population is generated. The total payoff piI of any agent I determines its reproduc-
tive fitness fI = exp(β.piI). The inverse temperature parameter β represents the strength of
selection pressure. For each cell (k, l), a parent I is randomly picked in the r-neighborhood
Nr((k, l)) with probability proportional to its reproductive fitness fI . Hence, the probabil-
ity of being picked for reproduction among the agents of a given r-neighborhood is given
by a softmax function of the total payoffs in the neighborhood [27]. In the limit β → ∞,
the agents with the highest payoff are selected for reproduction. For β = 0, payoffs are
irrelevant and parents are picked with equal probability. We then consider two treatments:
• Inherited tag treatment. The new agent inherits its parent’s tag. With mutation
probability µT , mutants are given a random tag drawn with uniform probability.
• Random tag treatment. The new agent is given a random tag drawn with uniform
probability.
In all treatments, the new agent inherits its parent’s strategy with mutation probability
µS. Mutants are given a random strategy drawn with uniform probability in {0, 1}×{0, 1}.
In the following, we will consider an equal probability of mutation for tags and strategies
in the inherited tag treatment and denote µS = µT = µ. In the random tag treatment,
µS = µ denotes the strategy mutation probability. In the inherited tag treatment, tag and
strategy mutations are independent.
Unless stated otherwise, simulations are run for G generations which we checked is large
enough for stationary states to be reached. In Table 1, we display the default parameter
values for our simulations.
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Parameter Value Description
n 50 Grid width and length
µ 0.03 Mutation probability
r 1 Neighborhoods size
β 1 Inverse temperature
c 1 Cooperation cost
b 4.2 Cooperation benefit
T 2 Number of possible tags
G 20,000 Number of generations
Table 1: Parameters and default value.
3 Results
3.1 Emergence of heterophily
Figure 2 shows the proportion of each strategy in the population at generation 20,000
as a function of the benefit of cooperation b, with other parameters set to their default
value (Table 1). Our results in the inherited tag treatment (Figure 2a) are consistent
with the classic results of the tag-based cooperation literature [2, 18]. For low values of
b, unconditional defection (strategy (0, 0)) predominates. For high values of b, homophily
(strategy (1, 0)) predominates as homophilic agents coordinate with their own kin and
form patches of like-tagged cooperating agents. This, obviously, cannot hold when tags are
not inherited but assigned randomly (Figure 2b). In this case, unconditional cooperation
predominates for large values of b, while unconditional defection still predominates for low
values of b. Interestingly, relatively high levels of heterophily (strategy (0, 1)) are reached
for b around 4.2 when tags are assigned at random.
This is best illustrated in Figure 3 where we show the evolution of the proportion of
each strategy over generations for b = 4.2. Stationary states are obtained very fast. When
tags are assigned randomly (Figure 3b), heterophilic agents represent close to 40 % of the
population, just below unconditional defectors (about 50 % of the population). This is to
be contrasted with the inherited tag treatment (Figure 3a), in which heterophily is almost
not present (about 10 % of the population). In the following, b is set to default value 4.2.
The emergence of heterophily in the random tag treatment still holds when all agents
in the initial generation are unconditional defectors (see Figure App-1 in Appendix). The
result also holds for neighborhood size r = 2 (see Figure App-2 in Appendix). Yet more
thorough robustness checks show that heterophily only emerges in relatively small ranges
of parameter values. This has already been seen for parameter b when other parameters are
set to their default value (Figure 2b). Similarly, our result only holds for a restricted range
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(a) Inherited tags (b) Random tags
Figure 2: Evolution of the proportion of each strategy at generation 20,000 depending on
b and for the different treatments. From darkest to lightest grey: strategies (0, 0), (0, 1),
(1, 0), (1, 1). Plain lines are averages and dashed lines are 95 % confidence intervals for 24
simulation runs.
of inverse temperatures β and of strategy mutation probabilities µ when other parameters
are set to their default value (Figures App-4 and App-6 in Appendix). In the βb-plane,
a maximal heterophilic population around 30–40 % of the whole is reached along a crest
(Figure App-5d in Appendix). The range of b values for which high levels of heterophily
are reached is smaller for the small values of µ typically found in the literature [2, 18].
Finally, the result does not hold in a model implementing Von Neumann neighborhoods
(Figure App-3).
Still, the advantage of heterophily in the random tag treatment remains non negligible
in magnitude, and as we will now illustrate, its cause is worth being explained further.
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(a) Inherited tags (b) Random tags
Figure 3: Evolution of the proportion of each strategy for simulations with the base case
parameters and for the different treatments. From darkest to lightest grey: strategies (0, 0),
(0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1). Plain lines are averages and dashed lines are 95 % confidence intervals
for 24 simulation runs.
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3.2 Explanation
In order to explain the evolutionary advantage of heterophily, let us simplify a bit our
framework and allow only for heterophily and homophily. In Figure 4, we show the results
obtained with the same model and parameter values as previously, but restricting the set of
strategies to {(0, 1), (1, 0)}. In the inherited tag treatment (Figure 4a), homophilic agents
are still able to form clusters of like-tagged cooperators and come to predominate. In the
random tag treatment (Figure 4b), heterophilic agents predominate. We also find that
heterophily can emerge and persist for any value of b, which suggests that the emergence
of heterophily is only prevented for values of b outside a small range by the presence of
unconditional cooperators and defectors in our base model (see Figure 2b). Importantly,
in the the random tag treatment, heterophily predominates from the very first generation.
This contrasts with the emergence of homophily in the inherited tag treatment, and with
the emergence of heterophily reported in previous studies [18], which unfold over several
generations.
(a) Inherited tags (b) Random tags
Figure 4: Evolution of the proportion of each strategy for simulations with the base case
parameters, for the different treatments and with strategies (0, 1) (dark grey) and (1, 0)
(light grey) only. Plain lines are averages and dashed lines are 95 % confidence intervals
for 24 simulation runs.
That heterophilic agents perform comparatively better in the random tag treatment
than in the inherited tag treatment, while homophilic agents perform comparatively worse,
comes as no surprise. In the initial state in both treatments, the expected payoff per
interaction of any agent is (b − c)/2. In the inherited tag treatment, heterophilic agents
get a payoff of 0 when interacting with their kin, while homophilic agents get a payoff
of b − c when interacting with their own and are able to form clusters. By contrast, in
the random tag treatment, tags bring no information about kinship (all agents have a 1/2
probability of bearing either tag), thus both heterophilic and homophilic agents have an
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expected payoff of (b− c)/2 when interacting with their kin. But following this reasoning,
one would expect equal levels of homophily and heterophily in the random tag treatment,
which does not match observation where heterophily is at an advantage even in the initial
state (Figure 4b).
Reasoning only in terms of expected payoffs actually misses one important point, that
is correlations between payoffs. In fact, the number of offspring of an agent does not
only depend on its own payoff, but also on the payoff of its neighbors with which it will
compete. To see this, let us focus on the initial state in the random tag treatment. As noted
above, the expected payoff per interaction for both heterophilic and homophilic agents is
(b − c)/2 = 1.6, that is a total expected payoff of 12.8 for 8 interactions. Similarly, the
expected total payoff of an heterophilic’s neighbor is 12.8 just as that of an homophilic’s
neighbor. We generated 1,000 initial states and found an average payoff of 12.802 with
95 % confidence interval (CI) 12.791–12.812 for heterophilic agents, and of 12.792 (95 %
CI: 12.781–12.803) for homophilic agents. The mean observed payoff of heterophilic agents’
neighbors is 12.795 (95 % CI: 12.792–12.798), and the mean observed payoff of homophilic
agents’ neighbors is 12.798 (95 % CI: 12.795–12.801). Hence, not only have homophilic
and heterophilic agents the same expected payoff, but their neighbors also have the same
expected payoffs. This fact, however, can be misleading as it tends to hide the correlations
between and agent’s payoff and its neighbors’.
In Figure 5, we show the average payoffs of an agent’s neighbors as a function of the
payoff of the agent itself, computed over the 1,000 initial states.4 We see that, first, an
agent’s payoff is indeed correlated to the average payoff of its neighbors, and, second,
that this correlation is different for heterophilic and homophilic agents. The differences in
payoff correlations translate into differences in offspring. Here, the observed mean number
of offspring is 1.121 (95 % CI: 1.118–1.125) for heterophilic agents and only 0.879 (95 %
CI: 0.875–0.882) for homophilic agents. In the random tag treatment, this advantage of
heterophily remains in the subsequent generations, giving rise to the preponderance of
heterophily.
4 Conclusion
A rich literature has shown how the introduction of inheritable tags can promote the
emergence of homophilic cooperation when individual interactions are modeled by the
4Strictly speaking, agents also compete with the neighbors of their direct neighbors. Unsurprisingly,
the correlation between an agent payoff and the payoffs of agents at a periodic distance of 2 is small. See
Figure App-8 in Appendix.
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Figure 5: Average payoffs of an agent’s neighbors as a function of the payoff of the agent
itself, depending on it having strategy (0, 1) (black) or (1, 0) (grey). Whiskers: 95 % CI
with 1,000 simulations of the initial state. Vertical grey lines separate the payoff bins.
prisoner’s dilemma game. In comparison to homophily, heterophily has received very little
attention.
In this article, we brought an additional example of emergence of heterophilic coop-
eration. We used a standard spatial model in which agents bear tags and interact with
their neighbors by playing the prisoner’s dilemma, using inherited strategies that are con-
tingent on their own and opponent’s tags. We showed that heterophily can emerge when
tags are assigned randomly to agents rather than inherited. Although the emergence of
heterophily does not occur over wide ranges of parameter values and highly depends on
the reproduction process, our result has some far-reaching implications.
First, the emergence of heterophily is qualitatively non negligible. In our instance,
heterophilic agents can make up about 40 % of the whole population.
Second, the emergence of heterophily is explained by the correlation between an agent’s
payoff and his neighbors’ payoffs, and by the corresponding differences in fitness between
neighbors. Such correlations are usually overlooked in the literature. Here, it is necessary
to look beyond averages, even conditional on strategies, to explain the result. We believe
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that our results and the underlying mechanisms could prevail more generally and have a
broader significance.
Finally, our work suggests a change in perspective. In the tag-based cooperation liter-
ature, the emergence of homophilic cooperation in the presence of inheritable tags is often
compared to its non-emergence in the absence of tags. But, as we have shown, payoff cor-
relations give rise to an advantage of heterophily over homophily when tags are assigned
at random. If we accept random tags and heterophily (another form of cooperation!) as
reference point, then the emergence of homophilic cooperation seems all the more puzzling
and a relevant subject of inquiry.
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Appendix
A Additional results
A.1 Change in initial state
(a) Inherited tags (b) Random tags
Figure App-1: Same as Figure 3 with initial strategy (0, 0) for all individuals.
A.2 Change in neighborhood definition
(a) Inherited tags (b) Random tags
Figure App-2: Same as Figure 3 with neighborhoods of size 2.
From Figure App-3: our result for random tags is not robust for another definition of
neighborhood (but we only check one dimensional changes). Nothing changes for inherited
tags (Figure App-3a).
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(a) Inherited tags (b) Random tags
Figure App-3: Same as Figure 3 with obtained with Von Neumann neighborhoods (North-
South-East-West adjacent cells).
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A.3 Change in inverse temperature
(a) Inherited tags (b) Random tags
Figure App-4: Evolution of the proportion of each strategy at generation 20,000 depending
on β and for the different treatments. From darkest to lightest grey: strategies (0, 0), (0, 1),
(1, 0), (1, 1). Plain lines are averages and dashed lines are 95 % confidence intervals for 24
simulation runs.
3
(a) Inherited tags, strategy (0, 0) (b) Random tags, strategy (0, 0)
(c) Inherited tags, strategy (0, 1) (d) Random tags, strategy (0, 1)
(e) Inherited tags, strategy (1, 0) (f) Random tags, strategy (1, 0)
(g) Inherited tags, strategy (1, 1) (h) Random tags, strategy (1, 1)
Figure App-5: Proportion of each strategy (color scale) at generation 20,000 depending on
β and b for the different treatments. Average proportions over 24 simulation runs.
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A.4 Change in strategy mutation probability
(a) Inherited tags (b) Random tags
Figure App-6: Evolution of the proportion of each strategy at generation 20,000 depending
on µ and for the different treatments. From darkest to lightest grey: strategies (0, 0), (0, 1),
(1, 0), (1, 1). Plain lines are averages and dashed lines are 95 % confidence intervals for 24
simulation runs.
(a) Inherited tags (b) Random tags
Figure App-7: Proportion of players with strategy (0, 1) at generation 20,000 depending on
b and µ (color scale) and for the different treatments. Plain lines are averages and candle
sticks are 95 % confidence intervals for 24 simulation runs.
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A.5 Payoff correlations in the 2-neighborhood
Figure App-8: Average payoffs in an agent’s 2-neighbors (excluding itself) as a function of
the payoff of the agent itself, depending on it having strategy (0, 1) (black) or (1, 0) (grey).
Whiskers: 95 % CI with 1,000 simulations of the initial state. Vertical grey lines separate
the payoff bins.
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